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Of Squares and Uncouth Twenty-Eight-Sided Figures:
Reflections on Gomillion v. Lightfoot After Half a Century
Jonathan L. Entin'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The civil rights movement generated many landmark U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. Among them were Brown v. Board of Education, I which
ruled that segregated schools are unconstitutional and provided the basis for
invalidating officially mandated segregation in various other sertings.t Cooper v. Aaron,) which made clear that opposition to Brown could not justify
4
resistance to desegregation; and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which imposed strict limitations on defamation claims by public officials against their
..
5
cntics.
Against this highlight list, it is easy to lose track of Gomillion v. Light./001,6 the Tuskegee gerrymandering case in which the Alabama Legislature
tried to remove virtually every African-American voter from the city limits by
changing the shape of the municipality "from a square to an uncouth twentyeight-sided figure.I" This Article reflects on Gomillion in connection with its
fiftieth anniversary. The case grew out of the emerging civil rights movement, which had deep roots in Alabama. It arose in a community with an unusually large black middle class that put considerable stock in voting rights.
Moreover, the ruling appears to have served as a precursor to the U.S. Su-

* Professor of Law and Political Science, Case western Reserve University.
1. 347 U.S. 4" (1954).
2. E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v, Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam) (municipal parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor and City Council of Balt. City Y. Dawson, 350 U.S.
877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches).
3. 358 u.s. I (1958).
4. 376 us. 254 (1964).
5. See generally ANTHONYLEWLS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVANCASE ANDTHEFIRSTAMENDMENT
(1991). Several other important First Amendment cases also grew out of the civil rights movement. E.g.,
Walker v, City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding contempt convictions of Marlin Luther King
Jr. and others for defying an injunction against Good Friday demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama); Bond
v, Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966) (overturning the refusal to seat a prominent civil rights activist who bad been
elected to the Georgia legislature): Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
(limiting the power ofa state agency to demand information about NAACP membership); N~CP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) (invalidating a Slate law aimed at limiting civil rights lawsuits by forbidding an organ 1zetion to refer potential litigants to specific lawyers where the organization was not a party 10 resulting litigation). See generally HARRY KALvEN,JR., THENEGRUANDT1-rEFrRSTAMENDMENT
(1965).
6. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
7. /d.at340.
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preme Court's landmark reapportionment ruling in Baker v. Carr.8 In addition, the Court's reasoning-the lead opinion relied only on the Fifteenth
Amendment, but a concurrence focused on the Fourteenth Amendment-has
led to continuing debate over the true meaning of the case, much as the lessons of Brown continue to provoke deep disagreement.
Part II of this Article provides some background about Gomillion, focusing both on the social and political dynamics of Tuskegee and on broader civil
rights developments. Part III addresses the Gomillion litigation directly. Part
IV assesses the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling and considers some
broader questions about the meaning of the case and its continuing significance.
II.

CONTEXT

Tuskegee, located about forty miles east of Montgomery, is the seat of
Macon County, Alabama. African Americans long have constituted a substantial majority of the population of the city and the county.f Whites nevertheless sought to maintain political control. They returned to power after the
1874 election and solidified their position two years later.lo Whites maintained their dominance for nearly ninety years, until the developments described in this Article fundamentally altered the political landscape. A key
mechanism for preserving white control, not only locally but statewide, was
the disenfranchisement of African Americans. A new state constitution
adopted in 1901 succeeded in its goal of purging blacks from the voter rolls. I I
Meanwhile, two other developments set the stage for later challenges to
white political supremacy. First, the Tuskeijee Institute was established in
1881 with the support of white conservatives. 2 Second, in 1923, the federal
government opened a hospital for black veterans of World War I in Tuskegee.
After some initial confusion and controversy, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") decided to staff the facility with African Americans. 13
Institute leader Booker T. Washington took a generally accommodating approach to racial issues and at least publicly acquiesced in the disenfranchisement efforts. 14 The Institute and the VA hospital, however, provided a pool
8.

369

u.s.

186 (1962)

9. BEiU'JARD TAPER, GOMILLION VERSUS LIGHTFOOT: THE RIGHT TO VOTE LN A.PARTHEID ALABAMA
II (1962).
10.

(1985).

ROBERT

J. NORRELL,

REAPING

THE WHiRLWIND:

THE CIVIL

RIGHTS

MOVEMENT

IN TUSKEGEE

10

11. See Hunter v. Underwood,
47l U.S. 222, 226-27 (1985); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRlCTION A"t\'DTHE ESTABUS~\1ENT OF THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH, 188019!0, at 165-71 (1974).
In Macon County, adoption of the new constitution
resulted ill an almost complete

disappearance of black voters: the number of African American registrants declined by about ninety-seven
percent from previous figures. See NORRELL, supra note 10, at 21; MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR
MASTERY: DISFRAl\'CHISEMENT OF THE SOUTH 1888-1908, at 173-94 (2001).
12. NORRELL, supra note 10, at 12 13.
13. Id. at 27-30.
14: . Although he did not take a public position about the [901 constitution, bchind the scenes WashingIOn facilitated two unsuccessful legal challcnges to disenfranchisement. See id. at 21. The U.S. Supreme

a
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of educated, middle-class blacks who challenged political apartheid in later
years.
The key figure in the later challenges was Charles G, Gomillion, a sociology professor at Tuskegee Institute and the lead plaintiff in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot. Gomillion joined the Tuskegee faculty in ]928 and spent the
1933-34 academic year at Fisk University studying with Charles Johnson, E.
Franklin Frazier, and Robert E. Park, a hugely influential scholar who was
visiting at Fisk after retiring from the University of Chicago. 15 On his return
to Alabama, Gomillion became active in what was then known as the Tuskegee Men's Club, which later was renamed the Tuskegee Civic Association (in
large part at Gomillion's behest). 16 He soon realized the importance of voting, but it took him five years to be able to register. At the time, prospective
voters not only had to pay a poll tax but under a regulation of the Macon
Coun~ Board of Registrars, also had to have two registered voters vouch for
them. 7 Gomillion finally was able to persuade a wbite contractor, who proposed to build him a house, to be his second voucher. The contractor agreed
to this after Gomillion made clear that the contractor would not receive full
payment for his work until he did so. 18
When World War II ended, African Americans in Tuskegee sought to
register in larger numbers than ever before. This reflected expansion at both
the VA hospital and the Institute, and it posed a threat to continuing white political control because most of Tuskegee's population growth consisted of African Americans. 19 Dilatory tactics by the registrars frustrated the vast majority of would-be voters. The Tuskegee Civic Association encouraged rejected
applicants to sue in state and federal court. Both lawsuits failed. ln Williams
v. Wright,20 the Alabama Supreme Court found that the applicant's failure to
comply with the Board of Registrars' voucher requirement defeated his claim.
The "fair, just and reasonable" rule had been administered without discrimination21 The Court reached this conclusion regardless of the fact that registrars
had discouraged African Americans from bringing vouchers with them when
they applied but then refused to contact those people so that the applicants
22
could be rejected based on failure to comply with the voucber rule.
23
The federal case of Mitchell v. Wright traveled a more complicated

Court rejected both on jurisdictional grounds. Giles v. Teasley, 193 If.S. 146 (1904); Giles v. Harris, 189
US. 475 (1903).
15. NORRELL,supra note 10, at 34-35; William A. Elwood, An Interview with Charles G. Gomillion,
40 CALLALQO 576, 578-79 (1989).
. .
16. NORRELL,supra note 10, at 35; Elwood, supra note 15, at 584. The renamed orgamzanon expanded its focus to include voting and opened its membership to women. NORRELL,supra note 10, at .41.
17. Of course, poll taxes since have been outlawed. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; 42 U.S.c. § 1973h
(2006); see generally Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
18. NORRELL, supra note 10, at 37; Elwood, supra note 15, at 584-85.
19. NORRELL, supra note 10, at 62.
20. 29 So. 2d 295 (Ala. 1947).
21. Jd at 297.
22. NORRELL, supra note lO, at 60.
.
23. 62 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1945), rev 'd and remanded, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Or. 1946), on remand,
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path. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama initially
dismissed the case because the plaintiff, VA hospital employee and Tuskegee
Civic Association activist William P. Mitchell, had not exhausted the "administrative remedy" of a state-court challenge to the registrars' rejection of his
application.f" The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the federal courts could entertain the claim and concluding that a
state-court challenge was not administrative in nature, so the exhaustion doctrine was not applicable.t" On remand, the district court concluded that there
was no evidence of racial discrimination and ruled in favor of the registrars.t?
Mitchell appealed, but at that point the registrars produced documents showing that his application bad been approved several years earlier, although nobody told him about it27 Accordingly, Mitchell's counsel reluctantly but appropriately moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. 28
Although these two lawsuits failed, the news for Tuskegee's civil rights
advocates was not entirely bleak. First, a district court struck down Alabama's Boswell Amendment, which required that voters be able to "understand and explain" any provision of the U.S. Constitution to the satisfaction of
29
local registrars.
The Boswell Amendment was adopted in 1946 in response
to Smith v. Allwrighl,30 in which the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed the white
primary." The district court emphasized both the inherent ambiguity of the
amendment's key terms and the overtly racist arguments advanced by its sup32
porters.
Second, in 1948 Gov. James E. "Big Jim" Folsom appointed a new
member of the Macon County Board of Registrars, Herman Bentley, who profoundly changed the treatment of aspiring African American voters33 Under
Bentley's leadership of the board, the number of blacks on the county voting
rolls quadrupled to nearly one-third of the electorate.r'" This threat to white
political domination prompted a backlash. First, the other two members of
the board stopped attending meetings, thereby depriving the body of a quorum

69 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Ala. 1947).
24. Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580, 584 (M.D. AJa. 1945).
25. Mitchell v, Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cit. 1946).
26. Mitchell v. Wright, 69 F. Supp. 698, 704 (M.D. Ala. 1947). This ruling came down about five
weeks before the Alabama Supreme Court decided Williams v, Wright. 29 So. 2d 295 (Ala. 1947). In rejecting Williams' claim, the state court relied on the Mitchell decision. See id.
27. See United States v. Alabama, 192 F. Supp. 677, 680 (M.D. Ala. 1961), ajJ'd, 304 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1962), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 37 (t962).
28. See NORRELL, supra note 10, at 68.
29. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 877 (S.D. Ala. 1949) (three-judge court) aird per curiam 336
U.S. 933 (1949).
• .
,
30. 321 us. 649 (1944).
31. Davis, 81 F. Supp. al 878-79; STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS:VOTING RIGHTS 11\' THE
SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 89-93 (1976); NORRELl-,supra note 10, at 55.

32. Davis, 81 F. Supp. at 877-80. For example, the State Democratic Executive Committee, a leading
proponent, argued that the Boswell Amendmeot would further its goal "to make the Democratic Party in Alabama the 'White Man's Party.' " ld. at 879.
33. NORRELL, supra note 10. at 74.
34. Id. at 74-75.
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and preventing it from processing additional applications.Y Second, shortly
after taking office early in 1951, Gov. Folsom's segregationist successor removed Bentley from the board nearly a year before Bentley's term was
scheduled to end.36
These developments, along with a new constitutional amendment requiring that voters be able to read any provision of the U.S. Constitution and
complete a complex form prepared by the Alabama Supreme Court, dramatically reduced African American voter registration after 1950.37 Meanwhile,
outside events influenced the situation in Tuskegee and Macon County. The
most dramatic of these was the U.S. Supreme Court's Brown decision, which
prompted widespread opposition throughout much of the South.38 Closer to
home in December 1955, Rosa Parks was arrested for refusing to surrender
her seat on a Montgomery bus to a white man. Her arrest sparked a successful 381-day boycott that propelled a previously unknown young minister,
Martin Luther King Jr., to international prominence39 Shortly afterward, to
the consternation of many whites, Autherine Lucy became the first African
American to enter the University of Alabama. 40
One of the leading resisters against civil rights reforms was Samuel M.
Engelhardt Jr. of Macon County, who was elected state representative in 1950
and state senator in 1954.41 Engelhardt quickly introduced legislation de42
signed to maintain segregation in the public schools
That proposal, three
years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Brown, was not adopted at the
time but was a precursor of subsequent events. Meanwhile, Engelhardt
steered other bills through the legislature that were intended to reduce the po43
litical significance of African Americans.
Folsom won another term as governor in 1954 and at least initially
seemed receptive to some black concerns. For example, he reappointed Bentley to chair the Macon County Board of Registrars in late 1955. Bentley continued to process applications from African Americans on a nondiscriminatory basis. With blacks constituting forty percent of the city's electorate and

35.
36.
37.
38.

[d. at 75.
ld. at 80.
LAWSON,supra note 31, at 97; NOItRELL,SUpra note 10, at 82-83.
For a comprehensive overview, see NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE
AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969) and MICHAEL J. KL.\,RMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
OVlL RIGHTS 398-421 (2004).
.
.
39. The boycott ended with the desegregation of the buses shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the ordinance that required separate seating. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam). See
generally TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KiNG YEARS, 1954-63, at 143-205
(1988); DAVJD J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CI-IRISTiJ\N
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 11-82 (1986); FRED D. GRAY, Bus RIDE TO JUSTICE 36-97 (1995); MARTIN
LUTHERK1.NG,JR., STRIDE TOWAlWFREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958).
40. See Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala. 1955), aff'd p'er o:riam, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir.
1955). For an account of Ms. Lucy's brief and tumultuous time at the umversuy, see E. CULPEPPER CLARK,
THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGA nON'S LAST STAND AT THE UNf\!ERSlTY OF ALABAMA 53-102 (1993).

41. NORRELL, supra note 10, at 79.
42. {do at 79-80.
43. {do at 82.

f.
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about one-third of the county voters, they effectively could control the outcome of any election in which whites were divided44 To forestall further
erosion of white domination, the only other member of the board soon resigned. This prevented the body from functioning.Y The governor, who had
lost considerable influence after getting into a very public battle with Engelhardt over a highway bond issue, vacillated, leaving the voting initiative to
Engelhardt and other die-hard resisters.46
Engelhardt moved quickly. He shepherded the Tuskegee gerrymandering bill through both houses of the legislature, which approved the measure
unanimously and without debate in July 195747 Folsom, who opposed the
measure, allowed it to become effective without his signature because he
thought a veto would be quixotic48 Engelhardt also proposed to abolish Macon County and divide it among five adjoining counties, an idea that ultimately failed due to the inability to secure agreement about how the pieces of
49
Macon County would be allocated.
III. LITIGA nON

Charles Gomillion was the lead plaintiff in the class action filed to challenge Act 140, the official name for the Tuskegee gerrymandering law. The
plaintiffs contended that this measure had removed "all but four or five of the
qualified Negro voters and none of the qualified white voters" from the cil/;'
limits and that the newly designed municipality looked like a "sea dragon.v
They alleged that Act 140 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fifteenth Amendment's prohibition against racial discrimination in voting51
The plaintiffs faced several daunting legal challenges. First, under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a long line of U.S. Supreme Court cases suggested
that slates had virtual plenary authority to control their political subdivi52
sions.
Second, under the Fifteenth Amendment, it was far from clear that
the plaintiffs were unconstitutionally deprived of the right to vote. To be sure,
they no longer resided in Tuskegee and therefore could not vote in municipal
elections, but they remained eligible to vote for county, state, and federal offices. Third, troubling questions existed about whether the controversy was
justiciable. There was a powerful argument that courts could not resolve is44. ld. at 89.
45. ta. at 89-90.
46. Id. at 87, 91.
47.
Tuskegee
48.
49.

~ct No. 140, ]957 Ala. Acts 185 ("To alter, re-arrange and re-define the boundaries of the City of

m Macon County'').
GRAY, supra note 39, at 115; NORRELL, supra note 10, at 95.
NORRELL, supra note 10, at 96--97.

50. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 407 (M.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
51. ldat406.

52. See, «s- Hunt,er v. City ofPinsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith,
U.S. 514 (1879); Comm rs of Laramie Cnty. v. Comm'rs of Albany Cnty., 92 U.S, 307 (1875).
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sues relating to voting districts. The leading case for this proposition was Colegrove v. Green,53 which affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to the gross
population disparities among Illinois congressional districts. It was in this
case that Justice Frankfurter famously warned that "[c[ourts ought not to enter
this political thicket.,,54
Judge Frank M. Johnson Jr. of the U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama dismissed the complaint. Without addressing the justiciability issues posed by Colegrove, Judge Johnson relied on the earlier U.S.
Supreme Court decisions allowing state legislaturesro make "arbitrar[y]
changers] [to] the territorial limits of a municipality.Y'' As to the claim that
the Alabama Legislature acted with the discriminatory purpose of depriving
African Americans of their voting rights, Judge Johnson concluded that legis56
lative motive was irrelevant to the validity ofthe gerrymandering law
A strikingly divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Judge Warren L. Jones wrote the majority opinion, which
closely tracked Judge Johnson's analysis. Judge Jones noted that, even if
there are federal constitutional limits on the authority of state legislatures to
alter municipal boundaries, Act 140 did not contravene those limits. 57 Moreover, because the stature was facially neutral, the court could not inquire into
the legislature's motivation 58
Judge John R. Brown dissented, observing that the panel was "troubled
by this decision. ,,59 He focused his opinion on the claim, implicit in Judge
Jones's opinion and explicit in that of a concurring colleague, that the case
presented such sensitive political issues that courts should not intervene. This
view, he argued, "is a denial of history.,,60 Judge Jolmson and Judge Jones
relied on U.S. Supreme Court cases that recognized some limits on legislative
power over municipalities, and in any event did not involve claims of racial
discrimination.61 Neither did Colegrove.62 The proper analytical framework
came from Smith v. Allwright and other cases involving race-based voting
rules63 Act 140's facial neutrality was also beside the point: the law was alleged to have removed virtually every black voter and no white voter from the
city limits, and that allegation was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 64

53. 328 u.s. 549 (1946).
54. Jd. at 556.
55. Gomifiion,] 67 F. Supp. at 408.
56. {d. at 409.
57. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. ]959).
58. fd. at 598.
59. Jd. at 599 (Brown, J., dissenting).
60. Jd. at 600.
61. Jd. at 604.
62. Jd. at 605.
63. fd. at 606.
64. Id. at 608. For this reason, Judge Brown found the discussion ofmotjv~tio~ to miss the mark. The
point was not to determine the views of individual legislators but to glean the leg~sl~1Jvepurpose. Id. at 6~O,
Moreover, the court had to inquire into the legislative purpose because the plaintiffs could not seek rehef
from the political process from which they were excluded, Id. at 61 L
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Judge John Minor Wisdom, who in the view of many admirers went
"astray in his first major civil rights case,,,65 wrote a concurrence tracking
Justice Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion. According to Judge Wisdom, the
challengers were seeking "a cure worse than the disease" because courts "are
incompetent to remap city limits. ,,66
The U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari posed something of a dilemma for Fred Gray, the twenty-nine-year-old lawyer who had filed the
complaint in the district court and who split the U.S. Supreme Court argument
with Robert L. Carter, the NAACP's general counsel. Gray very much
wanted to use a "before and after" map showing how the Alabama Legislatrue
had gerrymandered the Tuskegee city limits but could not do so in the district
court because Judge Johnson had dismissed the case on the pleadings. Gray
had to decide how to use the map in the U.S. Supreme Court. He placed the
map on an easel near the lectern. Not long into his argument, Justice Frankfurter spoke up. Instead of posing the sort of arcane jurisdictional question
for which the Justice was notorious, Frankfurter asked Gray to point out the
location of Tuskegee Institute in the wake of Act J 40 and expressed incredulity on learning that the Institute was now outside the city limits67
Less than four weeks after oral argument, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court. Justice Frankfurter, resting exclusively on
the Fifteenth Amendment, concluded that the complaint's racial gerrymandering allegations, "if proven, would abundantly establish that Act 140 was not
an ordinary geogr~hic redistricting measure even within familiar abuses of
gerrymandering.t'''
He added that, if the allegations were not rebutted at
trial, "the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned
with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of
town so as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote.,,69
Turning next to the suggestion of plenary legislative power to alter municipal boundaries, Justice Frankfurter said that the cases do not support such
a broad view. None of those cases addressed "a specific limitation upon State

65. Philip P. Frickey, Judge Wisdom and Voting Rights: The Judicia! Artist as Scholar and Pragmatist,
60 TV:" L. REv. 276, 295 (1985) .. ill.deed, Judge Wisdom himself acknowledged that bis Gomillion concurrence

was probably

my worst opinion."

JOEL WILLIAM

FRJEDMAN CHAMPION OF CIVIL RJGHTS'

JUDGE

JOHN MlNOR WISDOM 125 (2009).
'
.
66. Gomillion,
270 F.2d at 612 (Wisdo ill, J 0' concumn
.'
g) . Judge Wisdom
.
,
.
.
also relied on the U.S. Supreme Court s rejection of a challenge to G
.,
.
.
.
.
.
1 . . Jd
..
eorgia s unit-voting system that favored rural counties In legislauve e ecuons. . at 613 (dlscussrngSouth v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950»).

~:ilt

OPi.ni~:·as~'~~i~~~~;,a ~:
~~~
,121. One critic bas described the Court's inclusion of the map in its
.
p
nger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use a/Photographs
Maps,
d
h
an Ot er Images In Supreme Court Opinions 110 HARV L R.E !70
."
I·
who attended the oral argument has written that the rna ·,s ~isi~·.
,~, .]734 (1997). However,. ~Jo~ma 1St
essential question one that was to b
I
P
lity raised and kept before the Justices an
p~osc could tbe'State of Alabama eU~~~~~~d~\ som~.l.ength; namely, what reasonable and constitutional
9, at 84.
P
or dev ISing Such a tortuous boundary?" TAPER, supra note
68.

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 341 (1960)

69. ld.

'.
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power as confines the States under the fifteenth Amendment." 70 AU that the
previous cases determined was that the specific constitutional objections
raised by the challengers lacked merit. 71 Upholding Alabama's plenarypower argument would allow the state to eviscerate Fifteenth Amendment
protections under the guise of adjusting local boundaries.i''
Finally, Colegrove presented no justiciability barrier. According to Justice Frankfurter, the plaintiffs there complained only of vote dilution73
Gomillion, on the other hand, involved a claim of complete deprivation of
voting rights by virtue of the gerrymander. The Alabama Legislature allegedly had "single[d] out a readil1: isolated segment ofa racial minority for special discriminatory treatment." 4 This was hardl~ a "political" question but
rather a routine issue of "constitutional litigation." 5 Appended to the opinion
76
was the map that had so concerned Fred Gray.
All but two justices fully subscribed to Justice Frankfurter's opinion.
Justice Douglas joined the opinion but added a statement reiterating his disagreement with Colegrove and similar decisions.l" Justice Whittaker concurred, and preferred to rely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because he doubted whether the gen;tmandering law had completely deprived the plaintiffs of their right to vote. 8
On remand, Judge Johnson ruled in favor of the plaintiffs without conducting another hearing.79 The defendants answered the complaint, admitting
all of the allegations except the legislature's intent in adopting Act 140. Invoking Justice Frankfurter's statement that the allegations of the complaint, if
undisputed, would amount to a virtually "mathematical demonstration" of
discrimination.I'' Judge Johnson concluded that the gerrymandering law vio81
lated the Fifteenth Amendment and granted judgment on the pleadings.
IV. AFTERMATH

Although Gomillion v. Lightfoot led to the restoration of Tuskegee's
original boundaries and the reinstatement of about 400 voters to the municipal
electoral roster , the decision did not result in any new voter registrations.

70. ld at 343.
7 L Jd. at 344.
72. ld. at 345.
73. ld. at 346.
74. ld.
75. ld. a1347.
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
.,.
.
.
77. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 348 (Justice Douglas joined the majonty opuuon but adhered to the dissenting opiniun in Colegrove and South v. Peters, 339 lf.S. 276 {I950»).
78. /d. at 349 (Whittaker, J" concurring).
79. Gomillion v. Rutherford, 6 Race ReI. L. Rep. 241 (M.D. AJa. 1961);.see TA~ERJsupra note 9, ~t
116. The name of the lead defendant changed because most of the incumbent city officials were defeated III
the 1960 election or did not seek another term. Gomillion, 6 Race Ret L. Rep. at 2420.2; NORRELL, supra
notc 10, at 128-29.
80. See supra text accompanying note 69.
St. Gomillion, 6 Race ReI. L. Rep. at 243.
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Within three years, the number of black voters in Macon Coun more than
8
doubled and was almost as large as the number of white voters.
The surge
in enfranchised African Americans was a consequence of United States v. Alabama,83 a voting rights lawsuit filed by the federal government.
The Eisenhower administration filed suit in February 1959 against the
members of the Macon County Board of Registrars, the board as an entity,
and the State of Alabama following a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights investigation of voting discrimination in the county.84 Judge Johnson initially dismissed the case because the individual registrars had resigned their positions,
the Board of Registrars as an entity was not a proper defendant, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 did not authorize federal suits against states85 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed three months later. 86 Almost a year later, the U.S. Supreme
Court vacated the appellate judgment because President Eisenhower had
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1960 four days after oral argument, and the
new statute explicitly permitted the federal government to bring voting suits
.
8~
against states.
On remand, Judge Johnson found "overwhelming" evidence of racial
discrimination in the administration of the Macon County voting system. 88
He noted that there was no functioning board of registrars for extended periods during the previous fifteen years and that even when the board did function it treated African Americans worse than it treated whites89 The board
gave whites priority over blacks and gave assistance to white applicants with
limited education in completing their registration forms while denying help to
well-educated African Americans who made trivial errors that disqualified
their applications. It also required blacks to write lengthier excerpts of the
U.S. Constitution, graded applications submitted by African Americans more
harshly than applications submitted by whites, prevented approved African
Americans from voting by failing to mail registration certificates, and failed
to notify African Americans whose applications had been rejected. Not a single white application was rejected90 Moreover, during the previous year the
board devoted disproportionate attention to rural sections of the county when
the registrars knew that most demand for registration was in Tuskegee, thereby accepting slightly more applications during all of 1960 than a predecessor
board had received in a single day in 1958.91
82.

NORRELL, supra note 10, at 136.

83. 171 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Ala. 1959), aff'd, 267 F.ld 808 (5th Cir. 1959), vacated and remanded,
362 U.S. 60~ (1960), on remand, 192 F. Supp. 677 (M.D. Ala. 1961), afI'd, 304 F.ld 583 (5th Cir. 1962),
ajJ'd per curiam, 371 u.s. 37 (1962).
84. LA~'SON, supra note 31, at 215-20; NORRELL, Supra note 10, at 111-17.
85. U~I~ed ,States v, Alabama, 17] F. Supp. 720, 723, 728-29 (M.D. Ala. 1959). The suit was tiled
under the Civil RIghts Act of 1957.
86. Un~ted States v. Alabama, 267 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1959).
87. Un~ted States v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602, 604 (1960) (per curiam).
88. United States v. Alabama, ]92 F. Supp. 677, 679 (M.D. Ala. 1961)
89. /d. at 679 n.Z.
.
90. [d. at 679, 682.
91. [d. at 680-81.
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clear" showing of a pattern and practice

Johnson entered a detailed injunction that not only
but also required the board to take affirmative steps
and to assure prompt and efficient processing of fuorder specifically directed that several dozen named

applicants be placed on the voter rolls because the evidence established that
93
they were le~ally qualified to vote
The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge John95
son's ruling, 4 and the U.S. Supreme Court summarily affirmed
Although Gomillion v. Lightfoot had only limited effects on African
American voter registration, the case remains significant for several other reasons. First, despite Justice Frankfurter's attempt to keep the U.S. Supreme
Court out of the "political thicket" by resting the majority opinion exclusively
on the Fifteenth Amendment, commentators quickly recognized the potential
implications of the Tuskegee gerrymandering case for pending cases dealing
96
with legislative districting
Indeed, the Court specifically invoked Gomillion in Baker v. Carr,97 which held that claims of state legislative malappor.
.. bl e. 98
t·ionment are justicia

Gomillion also has played a role in the more general jurisprudence of
9
equal protection. For example, in Washington v. Davi/
the Court held that a
plaintiff must show a "racially discriminatory purpose" to establish a claim of
100
unconstitutional
discrimination.
The Court extended this principle to
claims of gender-based discrimination in Personnel Administrator of Massa. .
c h usetts v. Feeney, 101 w hilC h emp hasi
asize d t h at diiscnnunatory
purpose meant
that the challenged action was taken "at least in part 'because of,' not merely

92. Jd. at 682-83.
93. ld. The original list included sixty-four people, who were named in an appendix to the opinion.
Some of them bad applied as long ago as four years earlier. 'd. at 687-88 (app. E). Before the injunction
took effect, the state persuaded Judge Johnson that ten of (be original people were not in fact qualified to
vote. As a result, the final order included only Fifty-four names. Alabama Y. United States, 304 F.2d 583,
594 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. Alabama, 304 F.2d 583. On appeal, the state did not contest Judge Johnson's findings of discrimination but focused only on the order that the fifty-four named individuals be added to the voter rolls. Id. at
584. Judge John R. Brown, who had dissented from the dismissal of Gomillion, wrote a lengthy opinion rejecting the state's arguments. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. He concluded that, "had there
been no race discrimination as such, these persons would have been registered. Hence, [Judge Johnson) ordered what the Registrars should have done under their clear duty." Alabama, 304 F.2d at 594. Judge Ben
Cameron dissented accusing the majority of "embrac] ing] the doctrine that the end justifies the means." id.
at 595 (Cameron,
dissenting). Judge Cameron, an arch-segregationist, was consistently .host~le to ci~il
rights claims. For a review of his extraordinary efforts to prevent the desegregation of the University of MISsissippi, see Jonathan L. Entin, The Sign of "The Four": Judicial Assignment and the Rule of Law, 68 MISS.

J.,

LJ. 369. 385-86 (1998).
95. Alabama v, United States, 371 U.S. 37 (1962) (per curiam).
96. See, e.g., Jo Desha Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal o/Gomillion v. Lightfoo~, 1961 S~~.
CT REV 194 231-34' Comment Federal Constitutional Limitations on State Power over Political SubdiviSiO~IS, 61' COL~JM.L. ~v. 704, 71'2-15 (1961).
97. 369 u.s. 186,229-31 (1962).
..,
98. Justice Frankfurter, in his final term on the bench, produced a passionate Sixty-five page dissent
that also invoked Gomillion. See id. (Frankfurter. J., dissenting).
99. 426 U.s. 229 (1976).
100. Id. at 239.
101. 442 U.S. 256. 273 (1979).
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'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an Iidennifrabl e group. ,,102
Althougb Gomillion was not cited in the majority opinion in Washing/on
v. Davis, Justice Stevens, in concurrence, specifically invoked that precedent
for the proposition that a disproportionate impact "as dramatic as" that in
Gomillion would satisfy the purpose requirement. 103 The majority opinion in
Feeney did cite Gomillion to exemplify "a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious pretext for racial discrimination." 104
Meanwhile, the meaning of Gomillion remains a subject of disagreement. The debate appeared in starkest form in Shaw v. Reno,105 which dealt
with the constitutionality of so-called "majority minority" legislative districts.
Justice O'Connor's opinion for a five-person majority placed Gomillion front
and center. She emphasized that racial gerrymandering, illustrated by Gomillion, was especially pernicious.106 Later, invoking Justice Whittaker's concurrence that relied on the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Fifteenth
Amendment, Justice O'Connor emphasized that Gomillion "supports [the]
contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating
voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption.,,107 Any other approach would promote the appearance of "political apartheid.,,108 Gomillion
thus stands for the proposition that people of any race may challenge "a reapportionment plan [that] rationally cannot be understood as anything other than
an effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race
without sufficient justification." 109
In dissent, Justice White found the majority's invocation of Gomillion to
be "curious." 110 In that case, the majority gerrymandered the city limits "to
remove members of the minority, thereby denying them valuable municipal
services," whereas no s~ch deprivation occurs when the majoritrllcreate~ a
legislative district in which a nunonty can obtain representation.
Justice
Blackmun took a similar view, citing Gomillion for the proposition that "a
group with power over the electoral process" may not create boundaries "solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group"
but that no constitutional violation occurs "when the majori;r acts to facilitate
the election of a member of a group that lacks such power."] 2 Finally, Justice
Souter also cited Gomillion as a case in which "the disfavored voters [had
heen put] at the disadvantage of exclusion from the franchise without any alld. at 279.
Washington. 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, 1., concurring).
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
509 U.S. 630, 631 (1993).
ld. at 640.
Jd a1645.
/d at 647.
ld. at 652.
/d. at 668 (White, J., dissenting).
Ill. fdat669.
I] 2. [d. at 678 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

102.
J03.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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temative benefit," 113 whereas placement in one legislative district or another
"denies no one a right or benefit provided to others." I 14
The debate about Gomillion is analogous to the debate about the meaning of Brown that erupted in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. I. \15 Chief Justice Roberts, in the plurality opinion,
and Justice Thomas, in concurrence, repeatedly emphasized the essential illegitimacy of race-based policy-making and invoked a color-blind theory of the
Constitution.116 Justice Stevens, in dissent, argued that the plurality had rewritten "the history of one of this Court's most important decisions.,,117 Justice Breyer went further, emphasizing the distinction between exclusionary
and inclusionary uses of race and decrying blind adherence to a single standard.IIS
V. CONCLUSION

Gomillion v. Lightfoot was an unusual case, one that has been described
as "of novel impression.,,119 It sits within a small class involving facially
neutral policies with such overwhelmingly disproportionate effects that they
can be described only as the merest pretext for racial discrimination. Perhaps
the closest-maybe
the only-analogue in the U.S. Supreme Court's equal
protection jurisprudence is Yick Wo v. Hopkins,120 which invalidated a San
Francisco ordinance that required operators of laundries located in wooden
buildings to obtain a permit from the city council because seventy-nine of
eighty white applicants received permits while eve~ single one of the more
than two hnndred Chinese applicants was rejected. 1 1 Act 140 had a similar
effect: ninety-nine percent of the African American voters found tbemselves
outside the Tuskegee city limits, but not a single white voter was similarly affected.
Gomillion was unusual in another sense. Winning that case had only a
limited effect on black political participation. After all, the ruling simply allowed African Americans who were registered to vote to exercise the franchise in Tuskegee. It did not of its own force lead to additional registration.
The federal lawsuit expanded access to the ballot in Tuskegee and Macon
County. At the same time, the unusual features of Tuskegee-notably the Institute and the VA hospital that attracted an especially educated and inde-

113.

114.
115.
L. Entin,
(2008).
i16.
opinion);
L17.
118.
I 19.
120.
121.

Jd. at 681 (Souter, J., dissenting).
lei. at 681-82.
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (plurality opinion). for a more detailed analysis of this subject, see Jonathan
Parents Involved and the Meaning afBrown: An Old Debate Renewed, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 923
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 551 U.S. 701, 747-48 (2007) (plurality
id. at 772-73, 780, 782 (Thomas, J., concurring).

ld. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
ld. at 833 (Breyer, 1., dissenting).
Lucas, supra note 96, at 2! O.
L18 u.s. 356 (1886).
Seeid. at359.
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pendent middle class-were atypical of the sitnation confronting most unregistered black people. Gomillion was decided in 1960, but the Voting Rights
Act was not adopted until 1965. It took the Selma campaign of the Stndent
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference to mobilize national support for the Voting Rights Act.
In the end, Gomillion v. Lightfoot did not definitively resolve any problem. At the same time, the case played an important role in undermining
white supremacy in Tuskegee and Macon County, and it helped to pave the
way for the reapportionment decisions that, along with the Voting Rights Act,
have fundamental1y altered our politics. That is no small legacy.

